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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
CHARLES H. ORISON, sometimes
known as
CHAS. H. ORISON,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
HERMAN HERBRIG, a single man;
WILLIA~1 CHARLES HERBRIG and
wife, MARY -R. HERB RIG: ILA R.
WICHSTROM: FREDERICK HERBRIG, a single man: and LEOLA FORS- ' Case No.~
BERG, heirs-at-law of Millie M. Herbrig, deceased; and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title or interest in or lien upon the real property described in the pleadings adverse to the
complainant's ownership or clouding his
ti tie thereto,
Defendants and Appellants
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for
the County of Cache
Honorable

~ewis

Jones, District Judge
NEWEL G. DAINES
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
CHARLES H. ORISON, sometimes
known as
CHAS. H. ORISON,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
HERMAN HERBRIG, a single man;
WILLIA~1 CHARLES HERBRIG and
wife, MARY R. HERBRIG: ILA R.
WICHSTROM: FREDERICK HERBRIG, a single man: and LEOLA FORS-, Case No. 7329
BERG, heirs-at-law of Millie M. Herbrig, deceased; and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title or interest in or lien upon the real property described in the- pleadings adverse to the
complainant's ownership or clouding his
title thereto,
Defendants and Appellants
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was decided by the trial court on conflict
in the evidence.
As the Appellant set forth only those facts favoring
his position we, of necessity, must set forth the facts upon
which the trial court ruled in favor of Respondent.
1
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Millie M. Herbrig, the wife and mother of the Appellants, purchased the property in question June 9, 1917,
(Ex. "A," sheets 13-14) and owned it until ~1ay 1, 1937,
when title passed to Cache County because of unpaid
taxes (Exhibit ''A" Sheet 18). On May 26, 1937, Cache
County conveyed the property to the Respondent (Exhibit
"A/> sheet 19). On February 28 ,1951, Respondents filed
this notice to quiet title, ( R-2) thirteen years and nine
months after he acquired ownership.
~1illie

M. Herbrig and Herman Herbrig, her husband
and family lived in Logan until 1922 when they moved to
California where she died March 9, 1935. ( R. 74-75).
Her mother, Annie E. Orison for several years lived with
Mrs. Herbrig and family until her death June 16, 1936.
( R. 45). The Respondent attended his mother> s funeral
in California. ( R. 46).
The Respondent, between 1910 and 1946 lived at
Arbon, Idaho, when he 1noved to Logan. I:Iowever, beginning with the fall of 1936, during the winter months he
resided at Logan, Utah ( R. 44, 103). Arbon, Idaho, is
100 miles from Logan Utah ( R. 102). At the time of his
mother>s death and when he purchased the property he
was residing in Idaho ( R. 48, 102). Millie M. Her brig
on her death was survived by her husband Hern1an Herbrig and the following children: Ila Wichstrom, Leola
Forsberg, Fred 0. Herbrig ( R. 73). All of them, on May
26, 1937, the date Respondent purchased the property,
were residents of the State of California.
In 1942, the defendant Leola Forsberg moved to
Logan at which time she was told by Respondent that he
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owned the property in question having purchased it because of delinquent taxes. ( R. 42, 53, 54, 55, 92, 99).
Herman Herbrig testified that the Respondent while
attending his mother's funeral in California agreed with
him to look after the property, collect the rents, pay the
taxes and pay the mortgage indebtedness thereon which
was $150.00 plus some interest and maintain the property
for him and all of the children except the daughter Leola
Forsberg. That respondent was to keep the balance of the
rents for his trouble (Ex. 4, pages 4, 5, 6). This conversation the Respondent denied ( R. 48, 49, 50) .
From 1927 to 1946 the property was occupied by only
one tenant, Frederick Jufer and family ( R. 63, 111, 112).
Appellants, Herbrig and Ila Wichstrom, testified they received no rents after the death of Mrs. Orison in June,
1936. That Respondent collected rents from that date on.
( R. 84, Ex. 4, p. 8). This the respondent denied asserting
that he did not collect the rents until after he purchased
it on May 26, 1937. ( R. 50, 51). The tenants, Jufers,
testified that after the death of Millie M. Herbrig they
forwarded the rents to Appellant Herman Herbrig in California, until June or July, 1937, when they started paying
the rent to Respondent ( R. 63 64, 112, 113, 125, 127).
The Appellants received no tax notices after the sale
of the property to Respondents. Soon after the Respondent purchased the property in June or July, 1937, he called
on the Jufers who occupied the property as tenants, exhibited to them the deed he received from the County
conveying the property to him, advising Jufers he had
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purchased it because of unpaid taxes and directed them
thereafter to pay the rents to him. ( R. 50, 51, 64, 113) Mr.
Jufer wrote to Mr. Herbrig in California telling him the
Respondents claimed the property and that he had been
directed to pay him the rent. Mr. Herbrig replied requesting more information. To this letter Mr. Jufer then
replied advising Herbrig that the Respondent said he had
purchased the property because of delinquent taxes. No
reply was had to this letter. ( R. 64, 115, 116, 126, 127).
None of the Appellants except as above mentioned
ever communicated with the tenants regarding the property nor did they at any time communicate with Respondent regarding it, demand an accounting for the rents,
demand the rents nor did they claim any right, title or
ownership in the property until thirteen years and nine
months had passed after its purchase by the Respondents,
when this action was commenced. ( R. 65, 85, 86, 87, 89).
The property was subject to a mortgage in the sum of
$150.00 and interest which Respondent satisfied after he
purchased the property. He first learned of the mortagage
after its conveyance to him. ( R. 39, 51, 52).
ARGUMENT
In view of the evidence the trial court could not have
reasonably reached any other conclusion than that which
it did, namely, that there was never any agreement wherein the Respondent agreed to act as the Appellant's agent,
collecting the rents, paying the taxes and satisfying tl1c
mortgage. All of their acts were inconsistent with such
an understanding and the trial court very aptly stated it
when it said:
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"In the case of Orison vs. Herbrig findings and
decree may be prepared in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants the court finding that no agreement was ever entered into by the surviving husband
and the plaintiff, the court being influenced by the
conduct of the parties since the alleged date in that
the defendants have not conducted themselves in a
manner consistent with the. claim of ownership."
(R. 108).
The evidence is not contradicted that from the
time Respondent purchased the property, May 26,
1937, to the date this action was filed no inquiry was
made by any of the appellants regarding the property
except by Mrs. Forsberg who, in 1942, was told by
Respondent, her uncle, that he purchased the property, and the inquiry by Herman Herbrig in 1937
when he worte to Mr. Jufer, the tenant, requesting
additional information regarding Respondent's claim
of ownership. Appellants never claimed they owned
the property, did not visit it, make any demands on
the tenants for the payment of the rent or communicate with Respondent in any manner. Had there
been such an arrangement or had appellants claimed
to have owned the property during this period of
thirteen years and nine months some inquiries and
investigations would have been made regarding the
property. In other words, from 1937 until this action
to quiet title was commenced the Appellants took no
interest, except as above mentioned, in the property
which now has a value of approximately $2,000.00.
The evidence established further that the Appellants
knew that the Respondent claimed the ownership of the
property because in 1942 he told the Defendant Leola
Forsberg that he had purchased it and in 1937 Mr. Jufer,
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the tenant, wrote to Mr. Herbrig that the Respondent had
visited them, told them, he had purchased the property,
exhibited to them a deed to it and demanded that they
thereafter pay the rents to him which they did.
To support their contention of such an agreement it
was necessary for them to assert that immediately upon
the death of Mrs. Orison on June 16, 1936 the date of the
so-called agency agreement that the Respondent began
to ·~look after the property and collect the rents. That
after her death they received no rent on the property.
This position is not in keeping with the truth. The Respondent testified that he did not collect any rents until
he purchased it in ~1ay, 1937, as did the tenants, Jufers.
Mr. Jufer and his. daughter, Mrs. Marie Zimn1erman, testified that they forwarded the rents to California to appell~nts until June or July, 1937, when Respondent called on
them, exhibited his deed and requested payments thereafter be made to him.
The Appellants make a great deal 9f the fact over the
years Mrs. Orison lived with them, and that they cared for
her, paid her funeral and burial expenses. It is not clear
from the record just what the arrangement was between
Mrs. Orison and the Appellants except we do know that
she lived with. them from at least 1922 on. Apparently
there was more than a moral obligation in taking care of
her otherwise there would have been some demands made
upon Respondent and his sister, Leatha McNeal, to assist
in carrying the financial responsibilities for her support.
( Leatha McNeal after her sister's death did go to California and assist in the care of her mother.) If Respond-
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ent was delinquent in the support of his mother as they
contend it is highly questionable that they would have
reposed in him the responsibility of the care of the property in Utah when all that was involved was the collection
of rents and the payment of taxes which they could do by
mail nor would they have reiPained silent regarding the
property for approximately fourteen years after they had
notice that it had been purchased by Respondent, and
that he elaimed the ownership. Certainly, some investigation would have been made by them. The care of the
grandmother, Mrs. Orison apparently was an obligation
of the Appell~nts, and one not expected of the Respondent
otherwise they would have made some demand on the
Respondent to not only assist .in her financial support but
in taking care of her funeral and burial expenses.
IF A TRUST EXISTED IT WAS REPUDIATED BY
THE RESPONDENT MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION.
The evidence is undisputed that in 1942, Leola
Forsberg, one of the defendants, an heir of Millie M.
Herbrig, were told by the Respondent that he owned the
property having purchased it b~cause of unpaid taxes. Mr.
Jufer, the tenant, and his daughter, Marie Zimmerman
testified that in 1937, Mr. Jufer wrote to Mr. Herbrig, the
Appellant who claimed to have represented all of the
appellants, advising him that Respondent claimed that he
owned the property having purchased it because of delinquent taxes and that he had shown them a deed.
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-As to tlie question of notice the Court in the case of
Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake Investment Co., 134 P. 603,
43 Utah 181, said:
In Shain vs. Sresovich, 104 Cal. at page 405, 38
Pac. at page 52, the Supreme Court of California, in
passing upon the effect of a statute of which the
portion we have quoted above is an exact transcript,
says:
"The rule is well established that the means of
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge and that a
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the fraud of which he complains cannot
be supine and inactive, an.d afterwards allege a want
of knowledge that arose by reason of his laches or
negligence."
As to the question of notice, also see the Utah case of
Gibson vs. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 48 Utah 244; Smith vs.
Edwards, 17 P. 2nd 264, 81 Utah 244.
And as to when the Statute of Limitations begins to
run in such an action, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in the
case of Jack Waite Mining C., vs. West, 101 P. 2nd 202,
said:
( 1-3) We consider this last contention of defendant first, for if it be correct and applicable to the
facts, there is no need for us to go further. We think
it is the law that where the trustee of an express trust,
to the knowledge of his cestui que trust, repudiates
the trust and converts the property, the statute then
begins to run. Nor do we understand that plaintiff
questions this. We also think the better reasoning is
that even though plaintiff may not have notice of the
specific repudiation of the trust, yet if he knows facts
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from which a reasonable man would be put on notice
that the trust has been, or is about to be, repudiated,
this is equivalent to ach1al notice of the repudiation.
A cestui que trust should not be permitted to shut his
eyes and refuse to recognize a plain warning of danger
and then claim that he had no knowledge of the catastrophe when it comes. Weniger vs. Success Mining
Co., 8 cir. 22~7 F. 548.
And to the same effect is the Supreme Court of Montana in the case of State ex rei. Central Auxiliary Corporation vs. Rorabeck, County Treasurer, of Golden Valley
County, et al. (Phillips Inv. Co. et al., Interveners), 108
P 2nd 601.
The court said:
( 5, 6) It is generally held that as between the
trustee and the beneficiary of a trust, the status of
limitations does not run until the trust has been repudiated and notice of repudiation received by the
beneficiary. Blackford vs. City of Libby, supra; City
44 L. Ed 96. The rule is succintly stated in 4 Bogert
of New Orleans vs. Warner, 175 U. S. 120, 30 S. Ct.
on Trusts and Trustees, page 951, as follows:
"The true _rule with respect to the statute of limitations and express trusts is more clearly stated as
follows: During performance of the express trust
there is no cause of action for breach and so the
statue of limitations has no bearing on the .rights of
the cestui; but, if the trustee violates the trust and
the cestui knows of such conduct, or could have
learned of it by the use of reasonable diligence, the
court will apply the statute of limitations which governs equitable causes of action or an analagous statute
concerning legal causes of action. To cause the statute to begin running during the life of the trust there
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must be some act of repudiation of the trust by the
trustee, as where he declines to account to the cestui,
takes trust income for his own purpose, or sets himseH
up as the owner of the trust capital.
Also see Mayse vs. Mineola Co-op Exchange, 30
P. 2nd. 120.
In this case Appellants had actual notice that Respondent owned the property and if a trust ever existed
it was repudiated by Respondent more than seven years
before commencement of this action to quiet title.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we merely desire to say that the judgment of the trial court was in keeping with law and equity
and made upon a preponderance of the evidence and it
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
NEWEL G. DAINES
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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